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TRANSLATING FREEDOM FOR
POST-1997 HONG KONG
FRANCES H. FOSTER*
In its "mini-constitution"' for post-1997 Hong Kong, China seemingly
provides sweeping guarantees for Hong Kong's future under Chinese
sovereignty. Under the banner of "one country, two systems,"2 China's Basic
Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") of the
People's Republic of China3 ("Basic Law") promises to preserve Hong
Kong's "previous capitalist system and way of life ... unchanged for 50
years." 4 It grants Hong Kong a "high degree of autonomy. '5 It pledges to
maintain Hong Kong's "common law" legal system,6 "right of private
ownership of property"7 and a panoply of political and civil rights currently
not afforded China's own citizens.
8
* Professor of Law, Washington University. A.B., Princeton University, 1977; M.A., J.D., Yale
University, 1981; J.S.D., Stanford University, 1987. 1 thank Kathleen Clark, William Jones, Lynn
LoPucki, and Ronald Mann for their comments on earlier drafts of this article and Natalia Dronova for
her research assistance.
1. Hong Kong and foreign officials and commentators commonly refer to the Basic Law as
post-1997 Hong Kong's "mini-constitution." See, e.g., Charlotte Ku, People's Republic of China: The
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
Introductory Note, 29 I.L.M. 1511, 1511 (1990) ("Provisions of the Basic Law will serve as a 'mini-
constitution"); Christine Loh, Historical Case for Forming an Oligarchy, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 2, 1996, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (describing Basic Law as "Hong
Kong's future mini-constitution"); Carole J. Petersen, Equality as a Human Right: The Development of
Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong Kong, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 335, 349 (1996) (stating Basic
Law "will serve as the mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 1997"). While some Chinese
spokespersons have also used the term "mini-constitution" [xiao xianfa] (see, e.g., RONALD C. KEITH,
CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 185 (1994) (April 5, 1992 speech by "one of the most
senior PRC architects of the Basic Law," Ji Pengfei, referring to Basic Law as Hong Kong's "mini-
constitution"), others have explicitly rejected such characterization of the Basic Law. See, e.g., Zhang
Youyu, The Reasons for and Basic Principles in Formulating the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Basic Law And Its Essential Contents and Mode of Expression, 2 J. CHINESE L. 5, 7-8 (1988)
(Basic Law drafter stating "[t]here are those who call the Basic Law Hong Kong's 'little Constitution,'
but as has been seen, this appellation is quite inappropriate."). For a discussion of Chinese views
regarding the term "mini-constitution," see Perry Keller, Freedom of the Press in Hong Kong: Liberal
Values and Sovereign Interests, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 371,390 (1992).
2. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianggang Tebie Xingzheng Qu Jiben Fa [The Basic Law of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China] preamble (1990),
translated in 29 LL.M. 1511, 1520 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law].
3. See id.
4. Id. art. 5, at 1521.
5. Id. art. 2, at 1521.
6. Id. arL 8, at 1521.
7. Id. art. 6, at 1521.
8. See id. ch. HI, at 1525 ("Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents"). For a key
divergence between Basic Law and Chinese constitutional provisions, compare id. art. 37, at 1526
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In the final months before the July 1, 1997 handover, however, statements
by Chinese leaders suggested that China did not intend to honor these
"promises" to Hong Kong. Restrictive Chinese interpretations9 of one Basic
Law provision-article 27's broad guarantee that "Hong Kong residents shall
have freedom ... of the press"'--created serious concerns regarding the
meaning of post-1997 Hong Kong's "mini-constitution" as a whole.
Many Hong Kong and Western observers read these statements as a
signal that China plans to ignore the Basic Law and rely on political and
military power." In an earlier article, 12 1 argued that China has no need to do
(guaranteeing Hong Kong residents the "right to raise a family freely") with XIANFA [Constitution of
the People's Republic of China], art. 49 (1982) (P.R.C.) (imposing on People's Republic of China
("P.R.C.") citizens the "duty to practice family planning"). Many of the Basic Law rights and
freedoms have direct analogues in the P.R.C. Constitution. For example, both the Basic Law and the
P.RtC. Constitution guarantee freedom of speech (see Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 27, at 1525;
XIANFA, art. 35 (1982) (P.R.C.)), freedom of association (see id.), and freedom of religious belief (see
Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 32, at 1526; XIANFA, art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C.)). A key difference, however,
is that the Basic Law, unlike the P.R.C. Constitution, recognizes international law definitions of such
rights. Article 39 states that "provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and international labour conventions
as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region." Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 39, at 1526. The article also
stipulates that Hong Kong residents' rights and freedoms may be restricted "as prescribed by law" but
only if "[s]uch restrictions shall not contravene the provisions" of the aforementioned international
agreements. Id. The P.R.C. joined the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
in October 1997 and has announced that it plans to sign the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as well. See On Eve of Geneva Rights Talks, China Agrees to Sign U.N. Pact, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 1998, at A8. It remains to be seen what will be the impact on Chinese constitutional
definitions. Currently, there is considerable resentment among Chinese citizens regarding the
disparities between Hong Kong and P.R.C. rights. Thus, some feel that a "long-term threat" to "Hong
Kong's way of life... may ultimately come from the ordinary mainland public's bitterness at Chinese
citizens in a former British colony being allowed to enjoy privileges which they are denied." Danny
Gittings, Mainland Envy Poses Problem, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at 10, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
9. See China Assures Hong Kong of Press Freedom, But.... AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, June 1,
1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (Lu Ping, Director of China's Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office, announcing in a May 31, 1996 CNN interview: '"T]here will certainly be
freedom of [the] press after 1997... [t]hey can object to our policies. They can say anything they like,
but with regard to action, they have to be careful. Freedom of [the] press has to be regulated by laws'
and citing press advocacy of Hong Kong or Taiwan independence as an action that will "absolutely
not"' "be allowed" after the handover); Kathy Chen et al., China's Foreign Minister Issues Warnings,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1996, at A17 (Qian Qichen, Chinese Foreign Minister, stating that after July 1,
1997 the Hong Kong media 'can put forward criticism, but not rumors or lies. Nor can they put
forward personal attacks on the Chinese leaders'); Basic Law Adequate to Protect Freedoms Despite
Critics, RENMIN RIBAO (Beijing), Apr. 7, 1997, at 11, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB
File (Zeng Jianhui, Director of P.R.C. State Council Information Office emphasizing that "freedom of
the press" is "relative and limited" and does not permit media to "deceive the public and mislead
public opinion").
10. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 27, at 1525.
11. See Kieron Flynn, Dispute over Hong Kong Freedoms Escalates, Enters Diplomatic Arena,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct 18, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File
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so. Textual analysis of Hong Kong's two founding legal documents, the
Sino-British Joint Declaration 3 and the Basic Law, reveals that China's oft-
cited "promises" are essentially meaningless. These guarantees are framed in
such vague and indeterminate language that they provide no real constraint
on Chinese action in the post-1997 era. Hong Kong's "mini-constitution"
effectively gives China the authority to interpret its own "promises." Thus,
China, not Hong Kong or the West, will be the ultimate arbiter of Hong
Kong's freedoms.
This does not necessarily mean that China will act arbitrarily without
regard for its obligations under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. In
recent years, China has made a point of using legal arguments and texts to
justify its actions. 14 Even a body whose interpretation is final-the U.S.
Supreme Court, for example-must articulate a method to explain and
legitimize its interpretation. The issue, then, is how China will exercise its
virtually absolute power of interpretation. Specifically, where will it look for
definition of Basic Law guarantees, such as "freedom of the press?" Neither
the Joint Declaration nor the Basic Law provides any answers to these critical
(Christine Loh commenting that Qian's "remarks are raising fresh concerns about whether Hong Kong
people can maintain their current lifestyles as promised"); Emily Lau, Britain Shirking Duty Over
Freedoms, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 1996, at 20, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library,
SChina File (discussing British reaction to Lu's statement and "concer[n that] China may not abide by
the promises in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.").
12. See Frances H. Foster, The Illusory Promise: Freedom ofthe Press in Hong Kong, China, 73
IND. L.J. 765 (1998).
13. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu he Dabuliedian ji Bei Aierlan Lianhe Wangguo
Zhengfu Guanyu Xianggang Wenti de Lianhe Shengming [The Joint Declaration of the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong] (1984), in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO
GuOwUYUAN GONGBAO 503 (1985), translated in 23 LL.M. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
14. This has been particularly striking in the human rights context. See Guo Zu, Why Those Who
Study Law Act Against the Law-Mediation by Teachers and Students of China Politics and Law
University, RENMIN RIBAO (Beijing), Oct. 23, 1989, at 4 (providing detailed legal arguments on behalf
of official actions against Tiananmen Square demonstrators); Ren Yanshi, A Comparison of Human
Rights In China With Those In The United States, BEIJING REV., Apr. 1-7, 1996 (comparing texts of
U.S. and P.R.C. constitutions and concluding that "the Constitutional rights of Chinese citizens are
much more extensive and specific, and the Chinese government assumes much greater duty in
advancing and protecting human rights"); Judge Says Dissident Wang Dan Enjoyed Full Rights at
Trial, XINHUA (Beijing), Oct. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File (citing
legal arguments and texts to support conviction and imprisonment of Chinese dissident Wang Dan).
See generally William P. Alford, "Seek Truth From Facts"--Especially When They Are Unpleasant:
America's Understanding of China's Efforts at Law Reform, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 177, 181 n.23,
182 (1990) (discussing Chinese leadership's "use of the semblance of legality," and citing as "[a]
particularly glaring example," the 1980-81 trial of the Gang of Four); Edward J. Epstein, Law and
Legitimation in Post-Mao China, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA 19 (Pitman B.
Potter ed., 1994) (arguing that "[liaw was never more vigorously invoked to legitimate Communist
rule in the People's Republic of China than it has been in the present era of reforms").
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questions.
Indeterminate Is constitutional text and its potential dangers are familiar to
all legal systems, including our own.16 Constitutional guarantees of "freedom
of the press" have proven especially malleable worldwide.' 7 In the United
States, as elsewhere, 8 definitions and boundaries of press freedom have
shifted considerably over time to accommodate national emergencies,' 9
15. For a definition of "determinacy," see Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 56 (1992) ("the literary property of a rule: that which
makes its message clear").
16. For an outstanding comparative analysis of constitutional indeterminacy worldwide, see A.E.
Dick Howard, Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise Lecture Symposium: The Indeterminacy of
Constitutions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383 (1996) (discussing constitutional indeterminacy in
Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, South Africa, Ireland, Canada, and the
United States). There has been a "hot" and "somewhat vituperative debate" in United States legal
scholarship regarding indeterminacy of legal rules. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
HARV. L. REV. 468, 475 n.25 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 639, 679 (1990) ("continuing preoccupation with the indeterminacy debate"). An
examination of the extensive literature on indeterminacy is beyond the scope of this Article. For a
sampling of the literature, see, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV.
148 (1990); John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism,
or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84 (1995); Arthur J.
Jacobson, Taking Responsibility: Law's Relation to Justice and D'Amato's Deconstructive Practice,
90 Nv. U. L. REV. 1755 (1996); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1989);
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462
(1987).
17. Frederick Schauer has emphasized the "majestic indeterminacy" of constitutional guarantees
of freedom of press and speech worldwide and practical restrictions in both the United States and
foreign countries. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional
Categories, in CONSTITUTIONALIsM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES 353,359 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
18. For discussions of changing definitions of press freedom in foreign countries, see, e.g.,
ARTICLE 19, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE AGAINST CENSORSHIP, PRESS LAW AND PRACTICE: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRESS FREEDOM IN EUROPEAN AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES (1993) (Europe);
CHINA'S MEDIA, MEDIA'S CHINA (Chin-Chuan Lee ed., 1994) (China); PRESS LAW IN MODERN
DEMOCRACIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (Pnina Lahav ed., 1985) (United Kingdom, United States,
France, Germany, Sweden, Israel, Japan); Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of
Democracy: The Russian Experience, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (1996) (Russia); Peter Krug, Civil
Defamation Law and the Press in Russia: Private and Public Interests, the 1995 Civil Code, and the
Constitution, Part Two, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 297 (1996) (Russia, Europe); Stephen A.
Mertz, Justice Through the Eye of a Camera: Cameras in the Courtrooms in the United States,
Canada, England, and Scotland, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 673 (1996) (United States, Canada, England,
Scotland); Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.. 23 (1995) (United States, South Korea).
19. For example, since the Vietnam War, the U.S. "government has taken a decided turn toward
increased censorship" of media reports on military operations. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN
AN OPEN SOCIETY 302 (1992). See generally id. at 291-320; T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 335-59, 586-88 (6th ed. 1994); Matthew J. Jacobs, Note:
Assessing the Constitutionality of Press Restrictions in the Persian Gulf War. 44 STAN. L. REV. 675
(1992); Rana Jazayerli, Note: War and the First Amendment: A Call for Legislation to Protect A
Press' Right of Access to Military Operations, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131 (1997). Similar
"emergency" restrictions limit journalists' access to accident sites. See CARTER ET AL., supra, at 589-
[VCOL. 76:1!13
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changing standards of morality2" and fairness,21 technological advances,
22
and the like. In the process of application, the term has acquired such new
and diverse meanings that currently there exists little consensus in the United
States as to what precisely constitutes freedom of the press.
A perennial question in our own legal system, then, is how to ascertain
the meaning of indeterminate constitutional language. What techniques are
employed to resolve contested meaning and to fit text to changing
conditions? In this Article, I argue that this same question confronts China
today in interpreting the broad guarantees of its "mini-constitution" for Hong
Kong. As in the United States, there exists no settled mechanism or approach
to give content to these provisions. But, for China, what is at issue is Hong
92 (discussing cases limiting press access to automobile and airplane crash sites); 0. Marie Anderson,
Note: Mine Accident Investigations: Does the Press Have a Right to be Present?, 98 W. VA. L. REv.
1121 (1996) (considering press access to mine accident investigations).
20. Current examples of such changes include proposals to restrict First Amendment protection
for dissemination of hate speech (see, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE
DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); MAR J.
MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1993)); sexist or pornographic material (see, e.g., Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut
and the First Amendment: A Call for a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 87 (1996);
Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. I (1985)); violent images (see Ian Matheson Ballard, Jr., Note: See No Evil, Hear No
Evil: Television Violence and the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 175 (1995)); and tobacco
advertisements directed at children (see, e.g., John Harrington, Up In Smoke: The FTC'S Refusal to
Apply the "Unfairness Doctrine" to Camel Cigarette Advertising, 47 FED. COMM. L. J. 593 (1995)).
Morality concerns also have inspired recent attempts to curtail media undercover investigative
reporting (see Symposium, Undercover Newsgathering Techniques: Issues and Concerns, 4 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1005 (1996)); to mandate publication of sex offenders' names (see Michele L.
Earl-Hubbard, Comment: The Child Sex Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty
Deprivation, and Unintended Results Associated with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 NW. U.
L. REV. 788 (1996); Courtney Guyton Persons, Note: Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness,
Efflciency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes'
Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1525 (1996)); and to require media outlets to sequester proceeds from
contracts with criminal authors (see Garrett Epps, Wising Up: "Son of Sam" Laws and the Speech and
Press Clauses, 70 N.C. L. REV. 493 (1992)).
21. The O.J. Simpson trial, in particular, has prompted serious discussion about the possible
conflict between press rights and notions of a "fair trial." See, e.g., Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell
W. Contreras, Free Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting the Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly
Publicized Trial by Applying the Sheppard-M 'Min Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1587 (1996).
22. For a sampling of the vast literature on the challenges of new information technology to
traditional First Amendment definitions and doctrines, see, e.g., Keth A. Ditthavong, Paving the Way
for Women on the Information Superhighway: Curbing Sexism Not Freedoms, 4 AM. UJ. GENDER &
LAW 455 (1996); Donald W. Hawthorne & Monroe E. Price, Rewiring the First Amendment: Meaning,
Content and Public Broadcasting, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 499 (1994); M. Ethan Katsh,
Software and the First Amendment: Virtual Doorkeepers in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335
(1996); Michael I. Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the "Speaker"
Within the New Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79 (1995); Symposium: Emerging Media Technology
and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L. J. 1619 (1995).
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Kong's right to retain its own distinctive definitions of freedom.23
This Article explores possible approaches China might use to define
Basic Law freedoms for post-1997 Hong Kong. It focuses specifically on the
People's Republic of China ("T.R.C.") interpretation of one such freedom-
"freedom of the press." Part I identifies and considers six techniques recently
proposed by Hong Kong, Chinese, and foreign commentators, which I call
the strict literalist approach, the integrated constitution approach, the law on
the books approach, the law in action approach, the liberties with Chinese
characteristics approach, and the balancing approach. I argue that all six are
implausible. They fail to accommodate China's two key goals for the post-
1997 era-to maintain its formal commitment to the "one country, two
systems" policy and, at the same time, to preserve maximum flexibility to
respond to changing needs and circumstances during Hong Kong's fifty-year
transition from capitalism to socialism.
Parts II and III present a new framework, drawn from U.S. scholarship on
constitutional interpretation. 24 I argue that the metaphor of "translation" best
captures China's likely method of interpreting Hong Kong freedoms,
including "freedom of the press." Under this translation approach, China
will turn to pre-1997 Hong Kong definitions of "freedom of the press" as its
base standard and then "translate" them into the new context of a Hong Kong
that is now an "inalienable part"25 of China. As a result, Hong Kong will end
up with neither a Western nor a P.R.C. system of press freedom. It will
receive what China deems the "equivalent" of the "freedom of the press" it
enjoyed before the handover with a few "minor" adjustments to reflect
changed conditions in the post-1997 era. The Article concludes with a critical
evaluation of China's role as translator of Hong Kong freedom.
23. It should be noted that expansive definitions of Hong Kong freedoms are a relatively recent
phenomenon. During most of Hong Kong's colonial past there existed strict legal limitations on human
rights, including press freedom. See generally Ming K. Chan, The Imperfect Legacy: Defects in the
British Legal System in Colonial Hong Kong, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON, L. 133 (1997); Richard Klein,
The Empire Strikes Back: Britain's Use of the Law to Suppress Political Dissent in Hong Kong, 15
B.U. INT't. L.J. 1 (1997). Many of these laws still remained on the books in Hong Kong at the time of
the handover even though they had not been applied in practice for decades. See infra part I.C, D.
24. I draw particular inspiration from Lawrence Lessig's work on constitutional "translation."
See Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1785 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); Lawrence Lessig,
Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding
Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1994).
25. BasicLaw, supra note2, art 1, at 1521.
[VOL. 76:113
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I. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR DEFINING "FREEDOM OF THE PRESS"
Recent literature on Hong Kong suggests six approaches to interpreting
China's "freedom of the press" guarantee. Each of these approaches stresses
a different definitional point of reference, ranging from the literal language of
"freedom of the press" provisions in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
to general world understandings of the term "freedom of the press." All six
proposals are unlikely choices for China, however, because they impede
flexible implementation of China's "one country, two systems" policy.
A. The Strict Literalist Approach
The strict literalist approach defines "freedom of the press" in
accordance with the literal wording of the Joint Declaration and Basic Law
guarantees found in Paragraph 3(5) and Article 27 respectively. Paragraph
3(5) reads in pertinent part: "Rights and freedoms, including those ... of the
press ... will be ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. 26 Article 27 proclaims: "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom
... of the press and of publication."
27
Proponents of the strict literalist approach read these texts as mandating
absolute freedom of the press. They emphasize that there is "no mention ' 28 in
either provision of restrictions on media rights: 'No ifs or buts, no
qualifications, no phrases in brackets, no footnotes."' 29 Advocates of the
strict literalist approach claim that the language of the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law leaves "'ncroom for redefining what the pledge mean[t]."' 30
Thus, they conclude that post-1997 Hong Kong press freedom cannot be
"qualified in any way" by Chinese law or policy.
3
'
The strict literalist approach is the least likely choice for China. Its
26. Joint Declaration, supra note 13, 3 (5), at 1372.
27. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 27, at 1525.
28. Trevor Mason, China Pressed on Hong Kong Freedom ofSpeech, PRESS ASS'N NEWSFILE,
OCL 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (Malcolm Rifkind, British Foreign
Secretary, stated: 'Freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are guaranteed by the joint
declaration and the basic law and there is no mention of the kind of restrictions suggested by the
Foreign Minister [Qian Qichen] in his reported remarks."').
29. John Flint, Lu Tying Knots Over Free Press, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 6, 1996, at 4, in
FBIS-CHI-96-1 10, June 6, 1996, at 95 (quoting Christopher Patten, the last British Governor of Hong
Kong).
30. Fung Wai-Kong, World Focus on Press Freedom Under China, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
June 10, 1996, at 5, in FBIS-CHI-96-112, June 10, 1996, at 73 (quoting Christopher Patten, the last
British Governor of Hong Kong).
31. Id. ("Mr. Patten said the territory's press freedom should not be qualified in any way by
national Chinese law or by other policies.").
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origins alone make it suspect It first appeared in British critiques of China's
proposed restrictions on post-1997 Hong Kong's civil liberties. Its most
vocal proponent is former Hong Kong Governor Christopher Patten, whom
China has branded "the sinner of a thousand millennia." 32
Not surprisingly, China has already explicitly rejected the strict literalist
approach. It contends that this approach distorts the meaning of its Joint
Declaration and Basic Law "freedom of the press" guarantees by taking this
language out of the context of the document as a whole.33 It also argues that
by requiring absolute "freedom of the press," the strict literalist approach
contradicts existing Hong Kong legislation and foreign experience. Most
offensive to China is the symbolism of this approach. In theory, the strict
literalist approach limits P.R.C. regulatory authority in an "inalienable part"
of its own country. It thus intrudes on Chinese national sovereignty, a point
of considerable sensitivity to the Beijing government.3,
Critics of the strict literalist approach have missed its greatest drawback,
however. It confines definition to texts that are fundamentally flawed. As I
have discussed elsewhere, 36 close examination of the two "freedom of the
press" provisions reveals serious discrepancies between Chinese and
32. Tom Plate, Hong Kong's Houdini of Democracy; The Last British Governor, Chris Patten,
Put China on the Defensive and Made Himself a Hero Back Home, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1997, at B7
(Beijing "now calls the last British governor names like 'prostitute,' descendant of 'stinking
colonialism' and, in one of those sublimely original propaganda-mill phrases that can only originate in
China, 'the sinner of a thousand millennia.,").
33. See, e.g., Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool of Himsilf by Saying Something Revealing
His Ignorance of the Law, WEN WEI P0 (Hong Kong), June 7, 1996, at A2, translated in FBIS-CHI-
96-111, June 7, 1996, at 96 ("Regarding the Basic Law, Patten has adopted the method of cutting it
apart and taking it out of context.").
34. See, e.g., Yu Ming-shan, Lu Ping Answers Reporters' Questions in Japan (Full Text), WEN
WEI Po (Hong Kong), June 6, 1996, at B5, translated in FBIS-CHI-96-1 10, June 6, 1996, at 96 (Lu
Ping, defending restrictions on press "advocacy" of Hong Kong or Taiwan independence as "nothing
new. All countries have similar laws to prohibit secession and subversion. There is a similar law in
Hong Kong. It is even prohibited in Hong Kong to smear the British Queen, still more to subvert the
state."); Editorial, Freedom of Press and Observing Law Complement Each Other, WEN WEI P0
(Hong Kong), June 3, 1996, at A2, translated in FBIS-CHI-96-107, June 3, 1996, at 91 (describing
limits on press freedom in British Hong Kong).
35. See, e.g., Han Hua, Beying: Britain Should Not Vainly Try to Impose its Laws on Others,
WEN WEI PO (Hong Kong), Jan. 22, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, BBCSWB File
(Shen Guofang, Spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, arguing that repeal of unilateral British
amendments to Hong Kong laws "is purely an internal affair of China" and emphasizing that "[T]he
Chinese government now is not the pre-1949 Chinese government. We cannot accept anything that is
forced upon us.'). For discussions of Chinese concerns with sovereignty, see generally MICHAEL
YAHUDA, HONG KONG: CHINA'S CHALLENGE 111-13 (1996); Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane,
Cooking the Rice Without Cooking the Goose: The Rule of Law, the Battle over Business, and the
Quest for Prosperity in Hong Kong after 1997, in HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE: THE
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSION 62-65 (Warren I. Cohen & Li Zhao ed.,
1997).
36. See Foster, supra note 12.
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English-language texts,37 translation problems,38 and ambiguities.39 This
textual analysis suggests that the language of the Joint Declaration and Basic
Law "freedom of the press" guarantees may not in fact have the absolutist
meaning proponents claim for them4° or, for that matter, any meaning at all.
As a result, a strict literalist approach to "freedom of the press" ultimately
meets no one's needs. It does not provide an effective technique for defining
indeterminate statutory language nor does it offer any real check on Chinese
power to restrict Hong Kong media rights.
37. See id. at pt. II.C. (discussing problems created by different sentence structure and word
order of English and Chinese texts of Joint Declaration provision). See generally Albert H.Y. Chen,
1997: The Language of the Law in Hong Kong, 15 H.K.L.J. 19, 27 (1985); Anne S.Y. Cheung,
Towards a Bilingual Legal System-The Development of Chinese Legal Language, 19 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMp. L.J. 315, 323-24 (1997).
38. See Foster, supra note 12, at pt. II.B (discussing inaccurate translation of "press" as
"chuban," which refers to "publication" rather than mass media as a whole). See generally Ann D.
Jordan, Lost in the Translation: Two Legal Cultures, the Common Law Judiciary and the Basic Law of
the Hong Kong SpecialAdministrative Region, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J 335 (1997).
39. For example, paragraph 3(5) of the Joint Declaration uses the broad phrase "rights and
freedoms"7 "quanli he ziyou" to refer to a lengthy list of protected liberties, including those of the
press. Joint Declaration, supra note 13, 1 3(5), at 1372. Thus, it is uncertain whether the Joint
Declaration guarantees the Hong Kong media "rights," "freedoms" or both. This ambiguity causes
considerable confusion about the scope of press liberties. In Chinese, the terms quanli ["right"] and
ziyou ["freedom"] have distinct meanings and legal effects. "Freedoms" are subordinate to "rights."
See Foster, supra note 12, at pt. II.A. A Hong Kong commentator has captured the difference between
"rights" and "freedoms":
If one has the "right7' to do something, other people must respect his actions. On the contrary, if
one is "free" to do something, there may be no obligation by third parties to respect his action; he,
in fact, may have to respect others' freedoms as well in doing what he wants.
Id. (citing Ting Wai, What Will the Basic Law Guarantee?-A Study of the Draft Basic Law from a
Political and Comparative Approach, 5 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN
STUD. 49,76 (1988)).
Another key ambiguity that appears in both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law is the term
"by law"r'yif." Neither Chinese nor English language texts provide a precise definition of this term.
This raises a series of questions. Does "law" refer solely to enacted legislation or a broad range of
legal norms, rules, and acts? Does it include pre-1997 as well as post-1997 Hong Kong law? If so,
does it recognize Hong Kong "law in action" as well as "law on the books?" Are Chinese national
statutes and/or international treaties "law?" For a discussion of these issues, see Foster, supra note 12,
at pts. II.D & II.B; Albert H.Y. Chen, The Basic Law and the Protection of Property Rights, 23
H.K.L.J. 31, 56-60 (1993) (discussing "yifa" language in Basic Law and questions it raises about the
legal effect and judicial enforceability of provisions); Richard Swede, One Territory-Three Systems?
The Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 44 INT'L& COMp. L.Q. 358, 377 (1995) (discussing yifa language).
40. Indeed, use of the term "freedom"i"ziyou" alone undermines the absolutist reading of the
"freedom of the press" guarantees. In Chinese, a "freedom" necessarily entails limitation, including
legal restriction, to prevent infringement of other people's freedoms and rights. Foster, supra note 12,
at pt. II.A. Moreover, use of this term may actually convey "negative rather than positive meanings,"
including associations "with social disruption, immorality, and acting without conscience." BOYE
LAFAYETTE DE MENTE, NTC'S DICTIONARY OF CHINA'S CULTURAL CODE WORDS 502 (1996). In
essence, "ziyou" signifies a "license to be bad," id. at 501, in both Chinese Confucian and communist
contexts. Foster, supra note 12, at pt. II.A.
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B. The Integrated Constitution Approach
The integrated constitution approach calls upon China to read meaning
from the context of the document as a whole. Proponents of this approach
make Hong Kong's "mini-constitution," the Basic Law, the primary source
of definition. They argue that the starting point for any definition of "freedom
of the press" is a "complete understanding" of the Basic Law. They claim that
the Basic Law is an "integrated constitution" that consists of "articles
providing freedoms and others setting out duties and responsibilities.' '4I They
regard these articles as mutually complementary.42 Thus, "[o]nly those who
accept the constraints of the Basic Law can enjoy the freedoms provided by
the Basic Law.'
3
Under this view, China's Basic Law pledge of "freedom of the press"
"encompass[es] two aspects"4-rights and duties. Accordingly, in defining
the term, China should not consider article 27's "freedom of the press"
guarantee in isolation. It should also take into account the "complementary"
Basic Law articles that narrow the parameters of that freedom.45 Supporters
of the integrated constitution approach commonly cite four such articles-
the preamble and articles 1, 18, and 23.46
The Basic Law's preamble and article 1 set out the overarching principles
that confine media and other civil liberties---"the need to 'uphold national
unity and territorial integrity'' 47 and Hong Kong's status as "an inalienable
part of the People's Republic of China.As Articles 18 and 23 provide the
41. Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool of Himself supra note 33, at 96.
42. See id. (stating that these Basic Law provisions "complement each other"); Editorial,
Freedom of Press and Observing Law, supra note 34, at 91 ("Freedom of Press and Observing Law
Complement Each Other"). Note that this linkage of rights and duties is consistent with P.R.C.
constitutional practice. Michael C. Davis, Anglo-American Constitutionalism with Chinese
Characteristics, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 761, 774-75 (1988) (discussing parallels with Chinese practice).
See generally John F. Copper, Defining Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 9 (Yuan-li Wu et al. eds., 1988); William C. Jones,
Constitutional Protection of Rights in PRC, in DONALD C. CLARKE Er AL., INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ch.4 (1997) (unpublished manuscript).
43. Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool ofHimself supra note 33, at 96.
44. Red Army; Chinese Official Says Press Freedom Will be Subject to New Laws on Treason
and Subversion, XINHUA (Beijing), June 2, 1996, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File
(quoting Zheng Guoxiong, Deputy Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the Xinhua News Agency).
See also Fung Wai-Kong & Linda Choy, Qian Moves to Allay HK Fears, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Nov. 3, 1996, at 5, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwid File (reporting that Chinese Vice
Premier Qian Qichen stated that "[b]oth aspects of the Basic Law should be taken into account.").
45. See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 27, at 1525.
46. See id. preamble, at 1520 and arts. 1, 18, and 23, at 1521, 1524.
47. Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool of Himself, supra note 33, at 97.
48. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 1, at 1521. See Red Army, supra note 44 ("The first article of
the Basic Law stipulates very clearly that the HKSAR is an inalienable part of the People's Republic
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basis for Chinese and Hong Kong legal restrictions on press activities. Article
18 grants the P.R.C. legislature power to extend mainland laws into Hong
Kong, including unilateral authority to declare a "state of war" or "state of
emergency" "by reason of turmoil. 'A9 Article 23 specifically directs the post-
handover Hong Kong government to "enact laws on its own to prohibit any
act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's
Government, or theft of state secrets .... ,50 Supporters of the integrated
constitution approach thus conclude that when the Basic Law is considered
in its entirety the real meaning of "freedom of press" emerges: "After July 1,
1997, Hong Kong people still can fully enjoy ... freedom of press" as well
as freedom of speech and freedom of publication. 51 "But all of these rights
must be within the scope of the law.
' 52
The integrated constitution approach originated as a critique of and
alternative to the strict literalist approach.5 3 Yet, ironically, it shares the
same fatal flaw. It relies exclusively 54 on a text that provides no concrete
guidance for future definition of problematic terms. This proposal essentially
is circular. The integrated constitution approach refers China to a document
riddled with ambiguities and gaps that itself depends on future interpretation
of China.")
49. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 18, at 1523. See Editorial, Freedom of Press and Observing
Law. supra note 34 (discussing the six P.R.C. national laws that will be extended to Hong Kong
pursuant to article 18 and stating that "After 1997, all press organizations must abide by these laws and
may not challenge them."). For a detailed examination of the possible negative implications of article
18 for Hong Kong press freedom, see Foster, supra note 12, at pt. lI.B.3.
50. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 23, at 1524. For examples of sources citing article 23, see, e.g.,
China Assures Hong Kong of Press Freedom, supra note 9; Fung & Choy, supra note 44. For a
discussion of potential applications of article 23 legislation to Hong Kong media activities, see Foster,
supra note 12, at pt. M.B.2.
51. China Seeks to Calm Hong Kong over Freedoms Post-1997, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct.
17, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (citing Shen Guofang, China's Deputy
United Nations Ambassador).
52. Id.
53. The integrated constitution approach appeared as a response to Christopher Patten's
absolutist readings of the Basic Law's article 27. See, e.g., Editorial, Freedom of Press and Observing
Law, supra note 34, at 91-92 ("Patten has also ignored the existence of Article 23 [of the Basic Law],
though he claims that he 'has read the Basic Law more than the Bible'.... Patten is the person who
first challenged the Basic Law. Although he pretends ignorance in the face of Article 23 of the Basic
Law, his ill intent is known to all."). See also Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool of Himself, supra
note 33.
54. See Editorial, Tung Chee-Hua Says That Proposals of Legal Sub-Group are Good, TA KUNG
PAO (Hong Kong), Jan. 24, 1997, at A2, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File ("To
guarantee human rights in Hong Kong, we must implement the Basic Law to the letter rather than
pursue other laws."); Comfort Women: Chinese Spokesman Says Basic Law Must be Upheld Fully,
XINHIUA (Beijing), July 10, 1996, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that
a "spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the [P.R.C.] State Council ... said that
every stipulation of the Basic Law should be completely implemented").
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to give it meaning. Thus, the integrated constitution approach also is not a
viable interpretative technique for China.5 6
C. The Law on the Books Approach
The law on the books approach preserves the meaning of "freedom of the
press" as codified in pre-1997 Hong Kong legislation. Proponents of this
approach claim that pre-handover laws define "f'eedom of the press" in
relative, not absolute, terms. They emphasize that British Hong Kong statutes
feature extensive controls on media access to and dissemination of
information.57 These include sweeping censorship regulations and a wide
range of criminal and administrative sanctions for publication of material that
incites rebellion or hatred, undermines national security, law and order, or
harms public health or morality.58
Proponents of the law on the books approach also contend that these pre-
handover laws supply definition of terms and concepts not covered fully in
the Basic Law. For example, when Chinese officials announced in 1996 that
Hong Kong's "freedom of the press" would extend to "reporting" but not
"advocacy" of Hong Kong or Taiwan independence, 59 supporters of this
position turned to pre-1997 statutes for guidance. They found "no lack of the
concept of 'advocacy' in the laws previously in force in Hong Kong." 60 In
particular, they cited Hong Kong's Film Censorship Ordinance, which
"dr[ew] a clear distinction between reporting and advocacy" and stipulated
55. For a discussion of Basic Law interpretation, see Foster, supra note 12, at pt. IlI.C.
56. This is not to say that China will abandon the integrated constitution approach altogether in
the post-1997 era. Most likely, it will continue to use this approach as one of many arguments to
justify introduction of Chinese and HKSAR restrictions on civil liberties.
57. See, e.g., Editorial, It Is Chris Patten Who Stirs Up Controversy Over Press Freedom, TA
KUNG PAO (Hong Kong), June 11, 1996, at A2, translated in FBIS-CHI-96-115, June 13, 1996, at 102
(citing "criminal clauses on incitement to rebellion, the Emergency Regulations Ordinance, the Public
Order Ordinance, and the Film Censorship Ordinance."). See also Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a
Fool of Himself supra note 33, at 97:
There are also laws restricting freedom of the media. It is not allowed to instigate subversion of
British rule, report in detail an ongoing case which may lead the public or judges to believe that a
certain person is guilty, vilify others, or publish salacious writing or pictures, nor is television
allowed to broadcast cigarette advertisements or television series or scenes of extreme violence
and obscenity. Can this be regarded as "absolute freedom"?
58. For a detailed description of these laws, see Richard Cullen, Freedom of the Press in Hong
Kong 3.2 (1996) (unpublished manuscript).
59. See, e.g., Peter Lim & Paul Harrington, Press Worried About Post-1997 Pressures, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, June 7, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (citing Lu Ping,
Director of China's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office); Liz Sly, Hong Kong Journalists Uneasy
Over Future; Chinese Reassurances of Free Press Have Opposite Effect, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1996, at
20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (same).
60. Editorial, It Is Chris Patten Who Stirs Up Controversy, supra note 57, at 102.
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"that from its theme and title to its method of description and wording, a film
must not promote, advocate, incite, or encourage crime, violence, or drug
abuse."
61
The strength of the law on the books approach is its apparent consistency
with China's "one country, two systems" policy. By using existing Hong
Kong, not P.R.C., legislation as its focal point, it lends support to China's
longstanding claim that this policy is not a P.R.C. "scheme or intrigue ...
[but] respects fully the historical background and reality of Hong Kong., 62 In
so doing, it also underscores China's commitment to fulfilling its Joint
Declaration and Basic Law pledges to define human rights, including
"freedom of the press," in accordance with the laws previously in force in
Hong Kong.63
The law on the books approach has two significant flaws, however. First,
due to ambiguous Joint Declaration and Basic Law language, it is unclear
what precisely constitutes Hong Kong's "law on the books." Both documents
contain sweeping guarantees that Hong Kong's "laws previously in force' '64
and "laws currently in force"65 shall remain effective in the post-1997 era.
They fail to provide any definition, however, of the temporal markers
"previously" and "currently." The result is three plausible and competing
interpretations of this language-Hong Kong legislation enacted prior to (1)
the Joint Declaration (1984); (2) the Basic Law (1990); or (3) the handover
(1997).
The choice of freeze date has important implications for Hong Kong's
media. In the final decade before the handover, British Hong Kong
authorities enacted a substantial body of new legislation, most notably a Bill
of Rights Ordinance codifying expansive rights of expression and
information.66 They also repealed or amended several outdated colonial-era
61. Id.
62. Deng's Theory Safeguarding HK Stability, CHINA DAILY, July 8, 1997, at 4 (citing Deng
Xiaoping).
63. See Joint Declaration, supra note 13, Annex I, § XIII, at 1377 ("The Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government shall maintain the rights and freedoms as provided for by the laws
previously in force in Hong Kong, including freedom... of the press...."); Basic Law, supra note 2,
art. 8, at 1521 (stating that "[t]he laws previously in force in Hong Kong... shall be maintained...').
64. See supra note 63.
65. See Joint Declaration, supra note 13, 3(3), at 1371 ("laws currently in force"). See also
Han, supra note 35 (Shen Guofang, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, claiming that both
Joint Declaration and Basic Law guarantee adoption of "laws currently in force in Hong Kong ... ").
66. Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Ordinance No. 59 (1991). For detailed discussion of
this statute, see generally Dennis Morris, Interpreting Hong Kong's Bill of Rights: Some Basic
Questions, 15 STATUTE L. REV. 126 (1994) (Part 1), 16 STATUTE L. REV. 144 (1995) (Part II), and 16
STATUTE L. REv 200 (1995) (Part II). For analysis of Bill of Rights' protections of freedom of the
press, see Keller, supra note 1, at 405-12.
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restrictions on civil liberties, including media rights, that had not been
applied in practice for years.67 Thus, a freeze date of June 30, 1997
effectively would exclude many68 of the provisions now cited b law on the
books approach proponents as limits on "freedom of the press. "
Second, the law on the books approach locks China into definitions that
will rapidly become obsolete. In the early years of the transition, pre-
handover legislation may indeed serve as a useful reference for resolving
Basic Law gaps and ambiguities. Over time, however, these laws
67. Such changes included amendments to six security-related and broadcasting laws that
"allow[ed] the authorities to suppress publications ... and prohibit links between Hong Kong and
overseas organizations." China's Challenge: Freedom of Expression in Hong Kong, ART. 19 BULL. 4
(Oct./Nov. 1996). See also Editorial, Repeal Draconian Laws, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 29,
1995, at 18, in FBIS-CHI-95-082, May 1, 1995, at 101 (discussing reforms "to protect the press-
freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and the Basic Law.").
68. In fact, despite repeated pleas from Hong Kong and foreign journalists, British Hong Kong
authorities ultimately removed only a fraction of the "outdated ... laws which threatened press
freedom." Catherine Ng, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 7, 1996, at 4, in FBIS-CHI-96-112, June 10,
1996, at 71 (describing efforts by Hong Kong Journalists Association and Article 19 International
Centre Against Censorship); ARTICLE 19/HONG KONG JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION, CHINA'S
CHALLENGE: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION-1996 ANNUAL REPORT (1996). Thus, one Hong Kong
journalist, concerned that "China could revive defunct British laws to restrict press freedoms," has
concluded that "[i]f China clamps down, the first one to blame is the colonial government." Daisy Li,
cited in Sly, supra note 59, at 20 (citing Daisy Li, Assignment Editor at Ming Pao newspaper and
Honorary Secretary of the Hong Kong Journalists Association).
69. Critics of this interpretation generally claim 1984 as the appropriate freeze date. They argue
that by unilaterally amending Hong Kong legislation without Chinese consent, the British side violated
its commitment as signatory of the Joint Declaration to ensure existing laws remain "basically
unchanged." See, e.g., Editorial, Administration Cannot Straddle 1997, Protest Will Only End as
Laughing Stock WEN WEI P0 (Hong Kong), Jan. 24, 1997, at A5, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library,
BBCSWB File. Under this reading, Hong Kong's "law on the books" encompasses all statutes in force
prior to signature of the Joint Declaration, except those that "contravene" the Basic Law and subject to
amendment by the HKSAR legislature. See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 8, at 1521. "Laws amended
by the British side by going back on its own word" are void. Editorial, Ifthe British Side Knew This
Would Happen, It Should Not Have Done It In The Beginning, WEN WEt P0 (Hong Kong), Jan. 22,
1997, at A2, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, BBCSWB File.
Chinese officials only have added to this confusion by presenting yet another interpretation of
Hong Kong's "law on the books." They have adopted an intermediate, compromise position regarding
post-1984 reforms of Hong Kong legislation. They reject only "major" (see, e.g., Lu Ping Stresses
Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended by British Hong Kong Government is Intended to
Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and Stabiliy, WEN WEI PO (Hong Kong), Jan. 26, 1997, at Al1,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, BBCSWB File (citing Lu Ping, Director of China's Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office) or "important' (see, e.g., China on Safeguarding Sino-British Joint
Declaration, XINHUA (Beijing), Jan. 29, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Xinhua File)
revisions to the original Hong Kong statutes. "Ordinary and minor amendments" remain effective in
the post- 1997 era. Zhao Jihua, cited in Zhao Jihua Says British Side Has Violated Joint Declaration By
Vigorously Amending Laws During Transition and the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress and the Preparatory Committee Have The Right To Examine Them in Accordance with the
Basic Law, WEN WEI P0 (Hong Kong), Jan. 25, 1997, at A12, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
BBCSWB File (citing Zhao Jihua, Senior Representative of the Chinese side of the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group). Chinese officials have provided no concrete definitions of the terms "major,"
"important," "ordinary," and "minor."
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increasingly will become irrelevant, more historical artifacts of the British
colonial era than practical guides for Chinese interpretation. Thus, by
directing China to pre-handover laws only, the law on the books approach
fails to meet China's future needs. It provides no meaningful technique or
source to address the new, unanticipated problems that only will emerge in
the process of implementing the "one country, two systems" policy. This lack
of flexibility makes the law on the books approach too an unlikely candidate
for Chinese adoption.
D. The Law in Action Approach
The law in action approach defines "freedom of the press" in accordance
with pre-1997 Hong Kong "law in action" rather than "law on the books."70
Proponents of this approach acknowledge that Hong Kong's official
legislation was repressive, even "draconian." 7' They emphasize, however,
that actual practice diverged markedly from the written text of these statutes.
The law as applied in pre-1997 Hong Kong was tolerant and protective of
media rights.72 Although full-fledged "freedom of the press" had neither
constitutional nor statutory guarantee in pre-handover Hong Kong, "it [was]
the rule."
73
Proponents of the law in action approach insist that this "rule" must
prevail in the post-1997 era as well to ensure Hong Kong's continued
success. 74 They argue that "[p]ress freedom is not only an issue of civil
liberties, but also of Hong Kong's economic viability. ' 75 They claim that
70. See generally ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921) (distinguishing
between "law on the books" and "law in action").
71. See, e.g., Editorial, Press Freedom May Be Give and Take, HONG KONG STANDARD, June 10,
1996, at 72, 73 (describing previous laws as "draconian").
72. See, e.g., Editorial, Media Matters, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 7, 1996, at 20, in FBIS-
CHI-96-1 11, June 7, 1996, at 98 ("Whatever old statutes may have been on the files, the press has
been answerable only to the courts and has been free to develop both editorially and commercially
within a stable and accountable legal framework."). See generally Cullen, supra note 58, at 3.2
(providing detailed description of pre-1997 Hong Kong media law and practice); Keller, supra note 1,
at 380-82 (discussing policy of "liberal tolerance").
73. Rainbow Rowell, Iowa Native to Study Journalists During Transition in Hong Kong, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Jan. 2, 1997, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (citing Louise
Benjamin).
74. See, e.g., Tim Connolly, A Pressing Concern; China's Influence is Inhibiting Media in Hong
Kong, Some Journalists Say. DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 14, 1997, at 1A, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Cumws File (stating Hong Kong's "continued success depends on an effective,
independent media corps"); Peter Preston, Commentary: Free Press is the Only Hope for Hong Kong;
The Greatest Fear is That Chinese Rule Will Mean Chinese Levels of Corruption--and Eventual
Destruction, GUARDIAN, Jan. 3, 1997, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
(describing "[firee journalism" as "absolutely fundamental to Hong Kong's economic success").
75. Indira A. R. Lakshmanan, Skeptics Fear China Will Curb Hong Kong's Famously Free
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expansive media rights is both a product and a mainstay of Hong Kong
capitalism.7 6 "Freedom of the press" has facilitated the flow of information
essential for economic decision-making and successful competition in world
markets." A free press has also served as an indispensable check on
government corruption and tyranny, thus promoting investor confidence,
economic stability, transparency, and predictability.78 Proponents conclude
that Chinese authorities must retain their predecessors' "high threshold of
tolerance" 79 for Hong Kong's "effective, independent media corps." 80
Otherwise, Hong Kong as we know it "will be dead."'"
The law in action approach offers powerful, pragmatic arguments for
preserving expansive pre-1997 definitions of "freedom of the press."
Proponents realistically assess Hong Kong's value to China as predominantly
economic in nature.82 They recognize that P.R.C. leaders' key policy
Press, COMM. APPEAL, Apr. 29, 1997, at A10, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
76. See Lydia Lum, Hong Kong's Uncertain Future; Journalists Fear Chinese Crackdown on
Press, HOUSTON CHRON., June 23, 1996, at 15, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
("Unlike the United States, which protects press freedoms in its constitution, Hong Kong's press
system has evolved alongside its free-market economy, perhaps even as a result of that economic
boom, observers say.").
77. See, e.g., Anson Chan Says Freedom Key to Hong Kong Success, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE,
Mar. 25, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (citing Anson Chan, a top Hong Kong
civil servant, who stated "[P]ress freedom and ensuring free flows of information are crucial to Hong
Kong's success"); Nick Higham, Chinese Rule May Put Great Wall of Silence Around Hong Kong,
MARKETING WK., May 29, 1997, at 17 (discussing importance of free flow of information);
Christopher Patten, Speech at Conference of Commonwealth Journalists Association (Jan. 27, 1997),
reprinted in M2 PRESSWiRF, Jan. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (same);
Jim Simon, Activist Warns of a Cloud on Hong Kong's Horizon, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at
A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (citing Martin Lee's statement that "curbs on
press freedom will halt the free flow of financial information that investors need.").
78. See, e.g., Emily Lau, Writing on the Wallfor Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 12,
1997, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File ("Without a free press, views critical of
the rich and the powerful will not be published. The ruling elites will literally be able to get away with
murder because whatever outrageous acts they perpetrate will not be reported."); Fung Wai-Kong,
"'World Focus on Press Freedom Under China, "'S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (citing Christopher Patten's statement discussing various
functions of free press, including "to hold the powerful to account, to break down, break through,
scramble over and tunnel under the barriers behind which bad decisions and corrupt decisions can too
easily be made in secret"); Tung-Tied, TIMES, Mar. 4, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (discussing role of media in limiting corruption).
79. Editorial, Press Freedom May Be Give and Take, supra note 71 ("high threshold of
tolerance"); Keller, supra note 1, at 380-82 (describing policy of"liberal tolerance).
80. Connolly, supra note 74.
81. Pilar Pereyra, H.K. Press Freedom Topic of Continuing Discussion, JAPAN ECONOMIC
NEwSwiRE, Aug. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (citing Jimmy Lai).
82. Hong Kong: Hong Kong, "We Just Cannot Go Back" EUROMONEY, Sept. 30, 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (citing Donald Tsang's statement that "[O]ur value to
China rests largely on our economic prosperity."); Lo Ping, CPC Document Says There Will Be Chaos
in Hong Kong, CHENG MING (Hong Kong), May 1, 1996, at 6, 6, translated in FBIS-CHI-96-086, May
2, 1996, at 99, 99 ("'Hong Kong has always been an economic center rather than a political one.
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objective is to sustain Hong Kong's economic prosperity and dynamism in
the post-handover era.8 3 They frame their defense of "freedom of the press"
accordingly as an economic necessity rather than a political ideal. Under the
law in action approach, a genuinely free press deserves protection because it
is a "pillar" underpinning Hong Kong's economic success.84
Despite its merits, the law in action approach is also an unlikely choice
for China. It is problematic in several respects. It requires P.R.C. interpreters
of Basic Law language to apply a media model antithetical to Chinese
ideology and experience. In essence, the Hong Kong model "regards the
media, the nation and the government as separate entities. 85 The Chinese
model, in sharp contrast, "identifies the government with the nation, puts the
highest premium on territorial integrity, and sees the media as one of its
integral elements. 8 6 Chinese leaders have already demonstrated their lack of
understanding and appreciation for the Hong Kong model. In at least two
instances-press criticism of government and advocacy of Hong Kong
independence-the Chinese government has declared Hong Kong media
rights subordinate to Chinese national interests.87 These recent restrictions
raise real doubts about the continued viability of a "freedom of the press"
definition that exalts media independence as a check on government.
Moreover, Chinese officials have explicitly rejected the idea that a free
press is vital to Hong Kong's economic success-the basic premise of the
law in action approach. For example, P.R.C. President Jiang Zemin has
proclaimed, "Hong Kong's prosperity in the past can not be attributed, as
some have suggested, to an independent judiciary and a free system of the
press, but mainly to the creativity of the Hong Kong people themselves" and
China's own "economic development. ' 88 Under this interpretation, previous
Herein lie its advantage and its value."').
83. See Prepared Testimony by Merle Goldman Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on Hong Kong, FED. NEWS SERVICE, July 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File
("China's leaders do not want to kill off the 'golden goose' of Hong Kong .... They view Hong
Kong's prosperity and stability as purely an economic matter...").
84. See Hong Kong, We Just Cannot Go Back, supra note 82 (citing Donald Tsang describing
"freedom of the press" as one of the "pillars underpinning Hong Kong's success, and the nature of
what I call Hong Kong-style capitalism").
85. Editorial, Media Matters, supra note 72, at 98.
86. Id. For general discussions of P.R.C. media law and policy see CHINA'S MEDIA, MEDIA'S
CHINA, supra note 18; Allison Liu Jernow, Don't Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists
in the Reform Era, 1994 OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD. 1 (No. 2);
Hilary K. Josephs, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Press in the People's Republic of China,
11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 191 (1993).
87. See Foster, supra note 12, at pt. I (discussing statements by Chinese officials). For
discussions of Chinese lack of understanding of Hong Kong media system, see generally Prepared
Testimony By Merle Goldman, supra note 83; Sly, supra note 59.
88. Chinese President Comments on Hong Kong, Says China's Stance Consistent, XINHUA
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definitions of "freedom of the press" are irrelevant. A sufficient guarantee for
future success is to "return Hong Kong to the motherland" and to allow its
people to be "masters" of their own country.89
The Singapore case adds firther support for China's position that
"freedom of the press" and economic prosperity are not in fact inextricably
linked. Singapore features what the law in action approach declares
impossible-a vibrant economy and severe repression of press and other
civil liberties.90 China currently is studying Singapore as a model for P.R.C.
information management and control. 91 Thus, Chinese interpreters ultimately
may look to Singapore, not pre-handover Hong Kong, for post-1997
definitions of media rights as well.92
Like the law on the books approach, the law in action approach also is
flawed because it is rooted in the past. It requires China to preserve British
colonial-era policy and practice. In so doing, it undermines P.R.C.
sovereignty over Hong Kong and restricts its power to adapt law and policy
to fit changing conditions in the post-1997 era.
Finally, the law in action approach defines "freedom of the press" in
accordance with Hong Kong needs rather than overall Chinese national
interests. It largely ignores Hong Kong's new status as an "inalienable part"
of China.93 It assumes that Hong Kong and Chinese interests coincide and
that both seek, above all, to maintain Hong Kong's economic vitality. In fact,
however, China has other competing interests in Hong Kong that are not as
compatible with Hong Kong needs and traditions. Chief among these is to
prevent Hong Kong from serving as a "base" of subversion against mainland
communist authorities. 94 Thus, Chinese interpreters of Basic Law language
(Beijing), Sept. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS Asiape Library, BBCSWB File (citing Jiang Zemin). See
also Editorial, Do a Good Job ofHongKongAffairs, TA KUNG PAO (Hong Kong), July 7, 1997, at A2,
translated in FBIS-CHI, July 7, 1997 (visited July 31, 1997) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov> ("Hong
Kong's present success is inseparable from the motherland's development and mainland people's
support.").
89. Chinese President Comments on Hong Kong, supra note 88 (citing Jiang Zemin).
90. For discussions of the Singapore model, see generally deLisle & Lane, supra note 35.
91. See Vivien Wong, Ideology Chief Visits Singapore for Tips on Internet, HONG KONG
STANDARD, July 13, 1996, at 6, in FBIS-CHI-96-139, July 18, 1996, at 23-24 (reporting that P.1.C.
delegation led by Communist Party's propaganda chief"visited Singapore to study ways of screening
out material on the Internet that is not in line with official ideology").
92. See Nicholas D. Kristof, On Beifing's Leash, the News In Hong Kong May Lose Bite, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1997, at Al (reporting that Hong Kong newspaper and magazine editors fear "Chinese
authorities will learn from Singapore's example"); Mazlan Nordin, Post-Colonial Period Holds Much
Promise for Hong Kong People, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at 12, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Cumws File (reporting that journalist Stephen Vines "felt that the 'mould in Singapore' would
be applied in Hong Kong after the takeover.").
93. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 1, at 1521.
94. See, e.g., Lo, supra note 82, at 99 (citing Jiang Zemin's statement that "[t]he central
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will likely reject the law in action approach for a technique that allows them
to balance all P.R.C. interests in Hong Kong. Recent events suggest that they
may adopt a definition of "freedom of the press" that gives greater weight to
Chinese national security than Hong Kong economic prosperity.
E. The Liberties with Chinese Characteristics Approach
The liberties with Chinese characteristics95 approach argues that
"Chinese" definitions of "freedom of the press" are determinative. It
emphasizes that Hong Kong is now a part of "one country"--China. It
stresses the shared Chinese values and traditions of Hong Kong and the
P.R.C., including a "belief in order and stability" and "an emphasis on
obligations to the community rather than rights of the individual."9 It claims
that the Hong Kong media system must serve the interests of all Chinese
people, not merely Hong Kong residents. This system must uphold "one
China '97 and promote the economic and political welfare of the entire
Chinese nation.
98
Accordingly, the liberties with Chinese characteristics approach confines
Hong Kong's "freedom of the press" to "those activities which 'a genuine
Chinese' would do." 99 It makes "patriotism" the litmus test for appropriate
journalistic behavior.10 It defines patriotism broadly in accordance with
Deng Xiaoping's three criteria: "respecting the nation, sincerely supporting
government will not allow Hong Kong to become a center for political struggle or an anti-China and
anti-communist international base.").
95. See Beiing Says Hong Kong Will Have Freedoms, Chinese Style, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
June 4, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-108, June 4, 1996, at 2 ("Hong Kong's citizens will have freedom of
speech and freedom of the press when Beijing regains control over the territory, but the liberties will
have Chinese characteristics...").
96. Chris Yeung, Balancing Act Over First Big Decision; "1 am firmly committed to safeguarding
the individual rights and freedoms ofHong Kong,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 17, 1997, at 17,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (citing Tung Chee-hwa).
97. See Chris Yeung, Press Should be Unfettered, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 2, 1997, at 10,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that "Chinese officials have reminded
Hong Kong people of the importance of upholding 'one China' and discussing implications for the
media).
98. See, e.g., Yeung, supra note 96 (Tung Chee-hwa stating 'We need to constantly remind
ourselves that whatever we do in Hong Kong, we must take into consideration China's objective of
continuing to create wealth for all Chinese people and to gain a rightful place as a leader among the
community of nations' and emphasizing that Hong Kong must not endanger the '"territorial integrity
and independence' of China).
99. Beijing Says Hong Kong Will Have Freedoms, supra note 95, at 2 (referring to statement by
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang).
100. See Lin Hsin-chih, There Are Still a Lot of Misgivings in Media Work, HSIN PAO (Hong
Kong), July 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing "standard of
patriotism" imposed on Hong Kong journalists).
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 76:113
the motherland's resumption of the exercise of its sovereignty over Hong
Kong, and not undermining Hong Kong's prosperity and stability.110'
As articulated, the liberties with Chinese characteristics approach offers
China flexibility but little else. It provides no concrete guidelines or sources
of meaning for interpreting Basic Law provisions. Its advocates propose
standards and definitions that are themselves ambiguous---"Chinese" and
"patriotism."
Because of these ambiguities, the liberties with Chinese characteristics
approach already lacks credibility with many Western and Hong Kong
observers. Viewed in its most positive light, this approach creates "mines"
and "traps" for the unwary journalist. 10 2 With no bright-line tests to
distinguish patriotic from unpatriotic behavior, this approach appears to chill
expression and encourage media self-censorship.10 3 In essence, it holds Hong
Kong "freedom of the press" hostage to changing P.R.C. notions of
patriotism.
At worst, the liberties with Chinese characteristics approach fuels Hong
Kong and Western suspicions that China plans to extend mainland
definitions of "freedom of the press" to Hong Kong. Despite repeated P.R.C.
statements to the contrary,'1 4 many observers fear that the ambiguous
adjective "Chinese" 05 is in fact synonymous with "P.R.C." They point to the
101. Id; Qian Qichen, Foreign Minister Qian on Return of Hong Kong, QIUSHI (Beijing), June
16, 1997, at 6, translated in FBIS-CI-I-97-184 (visited July 31, 1997) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>
(citing Deng Xiaoping's criteria for patriotism).
102. See Lin, supra note 100.
103. See, e.g., Lakshmanan, supra note 75 (discussing self-censorship and other "less obvious
forms of censorship"); Holly Porteous, Building bridges to Hong Kong, 9 JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV.,
no. 5, 219 (May 1, 1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File (discussing self-
censorship).
104. See, e.g., Qian, supra note 101 (citing Deng Xiaoping statement that a Hong Kong resident
can be a Chinese "patriot" "regardless of whether he believes in capitalism, feudalism, or even the
practice of slavery. We do not demand that they approve of the socialist system, only that they love the
motherland, love Hong Kong."); Wen Ming, What is the Purpose of the Western Media in 'Making a
Fuss' Over Hong Kong?, LIAOWANG (Beijing), Feb. 17, 1997, at 45, available in LEXIS, Asiape
Library, BBCSWB File ("The rumour spread by the Western media that the Chinese government
wants to force Hong Kong to practice the law prevailing in the mainland is all the more clotted
nonsense."); Zeng Jianhui, Protection of Hong Kong People's Rights and Freedoms, RENMIN RIBAO
(Beijing), Apr. 7, 1997, at 11, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, BBCSWB File ("The mainland
will not introduce its practice of managing the media to Hong Kong, and Hong Kong will continue to
act in line with the current operational mechanism and rules.').
105. Proponents of the liberties with Chinese characteristics approach never explicitly state that
P.R.C. definitions of "freedom of the press" are to be extended into Hong Kong. Instead, they use the
ambiguous adjective "Chinese." For example, at an October 1996 press conference, a Hong Kong
reporter requested that Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang clarify Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen's statement that the Hong Kong media would not be permitted to "put forward personal attacks
on Chinese leaders." The reporter asked: "How should 'personal attacks' be interpreted?" Shen's
response was: "It is not me who should interpret it, but you who should grasp it. Chinese dictionaries
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss1/10
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marked resemblance between rationales for the liberties with Chinese
characteristics approach and for recent repressions of the P.RC. media.1
0 6
They stress that China's own Constitution guarantees "freedom of the press"
in language identical to that of the Basic Law, yet "a free press ... does not
exist in practice."'1 7 As a result, many Hong Kong and Western
commentators fear that, out of expediency or inexperience,10 8  Chinese
interpreters will ultimately choose to follow familiar P.R.C. precedent rather
than fashion new meanings of "freedom of the press" specific to the Hong
Kong context
10 9
Thus, the liberties with Chinese characteristics approach also is not a
viable technique. Its adoption could actually prove detrimental to China's
larger policy goals. In particular, this approach could undermine the "one
country, two systems" model China proposes for not only Hong Kong but,
eventually, Macao, Taiwan, and the world.1 ' As P.R.C. leaders themselves
have acknowledged, public trust and confidence are essential for successful
implementation of this model."' By suggesting that in one context-press
give a clear definition." Chinese Spokesman Says Hong Kong Freedom of Speech Should be in
Keeping With Laii; TA KUNG PAO (Hong Kong), Oct. 18, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, Asiape
Library, BBCSWB File (emphasis supplied).
106. See Alison Smith, Patten Warns on Press Freedom; 'Self-censorship more realistic threat
than handcuffs and barred windows,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 28, 1997, at 7, available in
LEXIS, Asiape Library, SChina File (reporting that P.RtC. authorities ordered Chinese journalists "to
fill their reports with patriotism...").
107. Lakshmanan, supra note 75.
108. See Editorial, Media Matters, supra note 72 (discussing China's lack of experience and
understanding of Hong Kong press freedom); Prepared Testimony by Merle Goldman, supra note 83
("Beijing supports the trappings of Hong Kong's freedom of the press, but not the essence. Its leaders
fail to understand that Hong Kong's robust freedom of expression on political issues is integral to the
freedom of the press."); Sly, supra note 59 (arguing that a "vast gulf ... exists between China's
understanding of what press freedom means and the reality of how it is exercised in Hong Kong").
109. See Kristof, supra note 92 (discussing 'fears' of western experts and Hong Kong journalists
that new Hong Kong government will "import the Chinese legal concept of 'state security' and that
"journalists will be punished under Chinese rather than Hong Kong law"); Keith B. Richburg, Uptight
Hong Kong Countdown; British Colony Begins Emotional Last Year Before Chinese Rule, WASH.
POST, July 2, 1996, at Al (stating Hong Kong "pessimists say Chinese officials will try to ... impose
Chinese-style restrictions on free expression"); Yeung, supra note 97, at 10 (reporting that media "are
concerned that China's concepts, systems and practices of the press will seep into the SAR").
110. See Editorial, It Is of Profound Significance To Practice A Great Concept, TA KUNG PAO
(Hong Kong), July 4, 1997, at A2, translated in FBIS-CHI-97-186 (visited July 31, 1997)
<http://wnc.fedworld.gov> (claiming "application of 'one country, two systems' in Hong Kong ...
provide[sJ useful inspiration and experience in resolving international disputes"); Qian, supra note 101
(arguing "one country, two systems" policy is the "optimum method for preserving a stable and
flourishing Hong Kong," a "model" for the reunification of Macao and Taiwan, and "a model and
example for the international community in resolving existing problems and conflicts handed down
throughout history between different countries").
111. See, e.g., Qian, supra note 101 (citing Deng Xiaoping's statement that if reunification is
"accepted reluctantly, chaos will certainly ensue. Even if a violent confrontation were to be avoided,
Hong Kong would become desolated."). See also China: On Conviction in One Country, Two Systems,
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freedom-China might apply its own values and definitions, the liberties
with Chinese characteristics approach raises troubling questions about the
credibility of the "one country, two systems" formula as a whole.
F. The Balancing Approach
Finally, the balancing approach looks to international practice as the
standard for interpreting and implementing the Basic Law's "freedom of the
press" guarantee. Its proponents claim that foreign countries uniformly define
"freedom of the press" in relative, not absolute, terms." 2 They argue that
every sovereign nation has enacted laws that "redefine this liberty."'"13 They
point out that even China's most vociferous critics-the United States and
Great Britain-permit extensive legal restrictions on 'freedom of the press"
in the interests of national security."
4
Based on foreign precedent, proponents of the balancing approach
conclude that the proper interpretation of "freedom of the press" strikes a
"balance between individual rights and social order for the good of the entire
community."'" 5 Accordingly, they read the Basic Law's "freedom of the
SING TAO JIH PAO, July 1, 1997, at A2, translated in FBIS-CHI-97-184 (visited July 31, 1997)
<http://wnc.fedworld.gov> ("Chinese leaders truly believe that one country two systems can be
implemented and Hong Kong people should also have that conviction. If everyone believes that this
system will succeed, then it will succeed.").
112. See Chinese President Comments on Hong Kong, supra note 88 (reporting that "[o]n freedom
of the press, Jiang said that there is no press in the world that is not subject to laws and that there is no
absolute freedom of operating outside the law"); Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool of Himself
supra note 33, at 96, 97 (stating "no law in any country provides absolute freedom'); Official Says
Press Freedom "Fully Guaranteed," XINHUA (Beijing), Apr. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, BBCSWB File (reporting that Zeng Jianhui "noted" that "any freedom is relative and limited;
there is no absolute freedom or freedom without limits in the world.").
113. David Chu, Striking a Balance on Civil Liberties, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 1996,
at 20, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, SChina File.
114. See id. (discussing extensive U.S. "legal constraints against this freedom if it clashes with
national security"); Editorial, Chris Patten Makes a Fool of Himself supra note 33, at 97 (arguing that
"[n]o country allows acts of secession of territory and sovereignty and of subversion against the central
govemment" and stating that "British law prohibits acts of treason, and the crime of treason includes
betrayal of one's country, the secession of territory, and subversion of the Queen's rule"); Editorial,
Freedom of the Press and Observing Law, supra note 34 (citing British laws and asking "Why can the
British safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity and ban inciting remarks undermining unity,
while the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region SAR cannot pass legislation in light of Article 23
of the Basic Law to stop speeches advocating two Chinas and splittism?"); China's Hong Kong Chief
Says HK To be Trade Bridge, REUTERS FINANCIAL SERVICE, Mar. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (reporting that Lu Ping "said other countries including the United States
had laws limiting the freedom of the press to advocate secession.').
115. Tung Says PC Legal Panel Recommendation is Right, XINHUA (Beijing), Jan. 23, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Xinhua File. See also Chu, supra note 113 ("We all can be sure
that the SAR will do as America does by striking a balance between national security and safeguards
of press freedom as well as individual civil liberty.").
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press" guarantee as entailing necessarily both legal and ethical constraints on
Hong Kong media activities in order to achieve this delicate balance.!
16
The strength of the balancing approach is that it removes the definition of
"freedom of the press" from the specific China-Hong Kong context. Unlike
the liberties with Chinese characteristics approach, it suggests that Chinese
interpreters of this language will look beyond P.R.C. socialist practice to
consider internationally accepted meanings of the term.
Ironically, this resort to foreign precedent is the weakness of the
balancing approach as well. As the recent debate over media coverage of
celebrities has illustrated graphically, l"7 there currently exists no international
consensus as to what precisely constitute the appropriate boundaries of press
freedom. Even if all countries indeed strike a balance between individual and
societal interests, they do so at radically different points. Media activities
viewed as innocuous, even exemplary, in one country may be regarded as a
social danger in another country.'
18
116. See Everything in HK to Follow Law: Qian, XINHUA (Beijing), Nov. 2, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Xinhua File (Qian Qichen discussing ethical restrictions on freedom of the
press); Zeng, Protection of Hong Kong People's Rights and Freedoms, supra note 104 ("While
stressing freedom of the press, we should also pay attention to journalistic ethics. News reports should
be true and fair. Using fabrications to deceive the public and mislead public opinion, ignoring social
responsibility, and even defaming others will not be allowed by any society. Criticism of such cases
just helps to protect freedom of the press rather than hamper it.. . ."); Zheng Guoxiong Explains
Freedom of Press, TA KUNG PAO (Hong Kong), Oct. 18, 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, BBCSWB File (citing Zheng Guoxiong's statement that "We do not agree with using the
media to launch personal attacks on others. This and freedom of the press are two completely different
matters. I believe that it is not difficult for journalists who have professional integrity and ethics to
distinguish right from wrong.").
117. The August 1997 death of Princess Diana touched offa broad international discussion of the
conflicts between press freedom and celebrities' rights of privacy. The fatal car crash, which claimed
the lives of Diana, her companion Dodi Fayed, and her driver Henri Paul, allegedly occurred as a
result of the driver's attempt to elude pursuing paparazzi and reporters. Commentary on the crash
revealed vast differences worldwide in understandings of "freedom of the press." See Seth Faison, No
News; In China, Better Unread Than Read, N.Y. TtMES, Sept. 7, 1997, §4, at 5 (contrasting Western
and Chinese approaches to media coverage of Diana's death and concluding that "there is no real
danger of the privacy of movie stars or other celebrities being invaded by the Chinese media, nor of
anything offensive or distateful being published. The state, not the market, still rules the media in
China."). In several countries, Diana's death inspired proposals for new legal and ethical restrictions
on press activities. See Cass R. Sunstein, Reinforce the Walls ofPrivacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at
23 (arguing in favor of new legal limitations of media "intrusions on the privacy of celebrities"); Press
Clampdown, USA TODAY, Sept. 26, 1997, at 8A (discussing British Press Complaints Commission
proposal for strict new media code of ethics).
118. The case of Hong Kong journalist Xi Yang provides one example of these differences. In
1994, a Chinese court sentenced Xi to 12 years imprisonment for "stealing state secrets." Xi had
reported Chinese government plans to change interest rates and sell gold overseas, a "crime" in China
but not Hong Kong. As one Hong Kong editorial put it, "A reporter writing about such activities would
be considered by most people in Hong Kong as doing nothing more than his job. The severity of the
punishment was spine-chilling." Editorial, Growing Appreciation, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 27,
1997, at 18, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, SChina File. See Teresa Poole, China Plays its Press
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By directing interpreters to foreign experience, the balancing approach
offers no concrete guidelines or procedures for defining "freedom of the
press." In particular, it provides no meaningful, objective standards to judge
when a specific media activity is beneficial or detrimental to society. This
encourages unpredictable, arbitrary interpretation of Basic Law language.
Proponents of the balancing approach only compound this problem by citing
ethical, as well as legal, restrictions. They assume common world
understandings of "right" and "wrong" journalistic behavior that simply do
not exist.
Thus, all six proposed approaches are implausible choices for China. In
the next parts of this Article, I present a translation approach, which builds
upon recent U.S. literature on constitutional interpretation. I argue that this
approach offers a better framework for understanding China's likely
technique for interpreting Basic Law guarantees such as "freedom of the
press." Unlike the existing proposals, this translation approach advances
China's two key goals for Hong Kong. It showcases the "one country, two
systems" policy and, at the same time, ensures that China retains maximum
flexibility to respond to changing conditions during the transition era. Early
developments in post-1997 Hong Kong support this analysis but also expose
serious potential dangers of the translation approach for Hong Kong rights
and freedoms.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSLATION: U.S. PERSPECTIVES
In a series of recent influential'19 articles,120 Lawrence Lessig has
Card with Hong Kong, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 27, 1997, at 10, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (describing Xi Yang case).
119. Lessig's work has been the topic of numerous recent law review articles. For a sampling of
this literature, see Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247, 1365-
1517 (1997) (containing articles on Lessig's translation model by Lawrence Lessig, Steven G.
Calabresi, Sanford Levinson, Jed Rubenfeld, Abner S. Greene and panel discussion). Recent
applications of Lessig's model include Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625,2668 (1996) (citing Lessig's Fidelity
in Translation for support of argument that "treating today's sworn statements like the unswom
statements of the past might be the most accurate 'translation' of the Framers' understanding"); Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 816 n.223 (1994) ("Citizen
review panels can thus be seen as an excellent example of 'fidelity' in 'translation' as American law
becomes more bureaucratized, yet continues to pledge allegiance to the democratic and participatory
ethos underlying the jury system at the Founding."); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1173 n.9 (1995) (applying Lessig's notion of
translation to jury reforms); Elena N. Broder, (Net)vorkers' Rights: The NLRA and Employee
Electronic Communications, 105 YALE L.J. 1639, 1643 n.20 (1996) ("undertak[ing] ... a modest
exercise in 'translation,' a term I borrow from Lawrence Lessig"; Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted
Suicide, the Due Process Clause and "Fidelity in Translation," 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (1995)
(applying Lessig's translation model to context of assisted suicide); William Michael Treanor, Fame,
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elaborated12' a "translation" model for interpreting U.S. constitutional 122 text.
This model calls for a two-step process of interpretation. 123 Under the first
step, the interpreter determines the meaning of the text at issue as applied in
the original context. She considers the "facts, or values, or assumptions, or
structures, or patterns of thought" that led the author to choose the specific
language in question to convey meaning.124 Under the second step, the
interpreter attempts to preserve the original meaning by "translating" it into
the new context. To do so, she identifies any changes between the two
contexts in "presuppositions"'1 underlying the original reading of the text.126
The Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 758 (1997) (discussing how
translation model would approach War Powers Clause); William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 784 (1995)
(applying "analytic approach ... derived from Professor Lawrence Lessig's recent elaboration of a
translation model" to Takings Clause). For examples of recent critiques of the translation model, see
William W. Fisher HI, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the
Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1997); Michael J. Klarman,
Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 395 (1997) (arguing that the "translation enterprise is quite
hopeless").
120. See supra note 24 (listing recent articles by Lawrence Lessig dealing with constitutional
"translation").
121. As Lessig himself acknowledges, the notion of constitutional "translation" did not originate
with him. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1171 n.31 (providing detailed "list of
'translators,"' including both scholars and judges). Lessig states that his approach "comes closest in
substance to that suggested by Brest" (Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980)) "and in process to that Judge Posner describes as
'imaginative reconstruction"' (Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in
the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983)). Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1172
n.31. See JAMES BOYD WHITE; JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM (1990) (providing detailed analysis and examples of judicial interpretation as translation);
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 886 n.24
(1996) (adding as an antecedent for Lessig's translation notion Alexander M. Bickel's The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955)).
122. Lessig's model is not necessarily restricted to constitutional interpretation. See Michael
Wells, Punitive Damages for Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REV. 841, 847 (1997) ("Though Lessig
focuses mainly on constitutional issues, his thesis seems equally applicable to statutory
interpretation.").
123. For a summary of the two-step process, see Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at
1263. Perhaps the most concise statement of the two-step process of translation appears in Lessig,
Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 24, at 1372: "The two steps are these: The first is to locate a
meaning in an original context; the second is to ask how that meaning is to be carried to a current
context." (footnote omitted).
124. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1178. See also Jeanmarie K. Grubert, Note:
The Rehnquist Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context of Voting
Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1823 (1997) (summarizing Lessig's definition of background
context as "consist[ing] of the underlying facts and values which led the author to use particular words
to communicate the intended meaning in the text").
125. Lessig defines "presuppositions" as
the most significant elements [that] are not just relevant to an author's use, but are indeed relied
upon by the author when using the text---relied upon in just the sense that had they been other
than they were when the author first used these words, then the author would have used words
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She then reinterprets the text to accommodate these changes, "altering the
original reading as little as possible while seeking its modem
'equivalent.' '
127
Proponents claim that the translation model has significant advantages
over the two dominant approaches to constitutional interpretation,
originalism and textualism. 28 Unlike traditional originalism, which insists on
"applying the original text now the same as it would have been applied
then," 29 the translation model acknowledges and "neutralizes the effect of
changed context on a text's meaning."'130 As a result, it better ensures that the
original meaning of a text prevails over time and is not distorted or eroded by
changes in context.' 3 1 Proponents argue that the translation model is superior
other than she did.
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1179-80.
126. Id. at 1263 ("First, [the translator] identifies changes in presuppositions between the two
contexts.'). The translator must differentiate between "changes that matter to meaning" (i.e.
presuppositions) and "those changes that do not." Id. at 1178. Only the former are relevant for
purposes of the translation model. As Lessig explains,
While any element of an original context may change, and thus change something about the
significance of the text, when a presupposition changes something more significant happens.
When a presupposition changes, we imagine that the author would have accommodated that
change when she first used the text, at least had she had the chance. Or alternatively, a
presupposition marks out those elements of an interpretive context that, had they been different,
would have led to a change in text.
Id. at 1180.
127. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, supra
note 119, at 857 (summarizing Lessig's approach). See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24,
at 1213 (making the "crucial assumption" that "the translator has a duty to select the change that is
most conservative. The translator is to find the accommodation that makes the smallest possible
change in the legal material and still achieves fidelity.").
128. As Lessig acknowledges, "originalism" and "textualism" are "ideal types, and not ...
complete descriptions of any particular practice or the full range of practices." Lessig, Translating
Federalism, supra note 24, at 128 n.7.
129. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1183.
130. ld at 1189; Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, supra note 24, at 1370 ("Contexts change, so
readings must change. The aim of the translator is to find a reading that neutralizes the change in
context.").
131. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L. J. 1725, 1811 (1996)
(stating "the most appropriate way to maintain fidelity to the Founding is not through literal
'originalism,' such as that advanced by Justice Scalia and Judge Bork, but through models that serve
the Founders' more general purposes in light of changed circumstances," and citing Lessig's
"translation" approach as one such model); Grubert, supra note 124, at 1828 (arguing "[t]ranslation
remedies the failure of the originalist approach to keep the Constitution in tune with changing times");
Charles A. Reich, Property Law and the New Economic Order: A Betrayal of Middle Americans and
the Poor, 71 CHL-KENT L. REV. 817, 822 (1996) ("A Constitution is merely words-subject to
changes in meaning and context over time. As Lawrence Lessig has argued convincingly, fidelity to
the true meaning of the Constitution often requires an exercise in translation, the purpose ofwhich is
to bring the document's provisions forward to the changed context of today."); Shih, supra note 119, at
1271-72 (arguing translation model is "preferable to originalism" because it "incorporates the ratifiers'
intent into the method of interpretation" and also "attempt[s] to preserve the ratifiers' meaning when
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to textualism as well. The translation model expressly rejects the textualist
technique of ignoring original meanings of constitutional text and simply
adopting the reading that "is most compelling in the current context."'13 2 In so
doing, the translation model constrains judicial activism and promotes
"fidelity" to founding understandings of constitutional text.'33
Proponents of the translation model also recognize its potential dangers.
Specifically, they acknowledge the "immense power' 134 of the translator to
"improve," even rewrite, the original meaning of a text. As in the linguistic
context, the accuracy and quality of constitutional translation ultimately will
depend on the translator's skill and "commitment to fidelity."' 35 According
to Lessig, two safeguards, however, limit overly free translations of
constitutional text and meaning. The translation model itself contains one
safeguard-familiarity. Under the first step of the model's two-step process,
the interpreter first must become familiar with the original text and context,
the new context, and how they interrelate.'36 Only when the interpreter is 'at
home' in both contexts, understanding from where and to where meaning is
to be carried' 37 can she proceed with the process of translation. The other
safeguard-humility-is a "self-imposed ethic on the practice of
translation."'138 According to Lessig, the responsible interpreter necessarily
will refrain from any translation that is beyond the interpreter's political or
institutional authority ("structural humility") 139 or capacity ("[h]umility
change has occurred"). For discussion of how one set of changes-changes in technology--can affect
original meanings of constitutional text, see Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 24, at 132-35.
According to Lessig, the change of cyberspace may ultimately point to the limits of even the
translation technique. Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, supra note 24, at 874-75.
William Treanor argues that the translation model is superior to traditional originalism "[firom an
originalist standpoint" as well. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the
Political Process, supra note 119, at 857. He claims that by "allow[ing] the adaptation to changed
circumstances" (id. at 858), the translation model, unlike tranditional originalism, actually comports
better with the original framers' notion of the constitution as "flexible" and "adaptable." Id. at 857. See
also Grubert, supra note 124, at 1829 (arguing translation model is more "consistent with the
expectation of the Framers").
132. Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 24, at 128.
133. See Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1173 (arguing that translation contains
constraints "similar to the limitations of traditional judicial restraint" and best promotes fidelity);
Treanor, The Original Understanding ofthe Takings Clause and the Political Process, supra note 119,
at 856-58 (discussing how translation model constrains judicial decisionmaking and "aspires to be
faithful to the text, history, and structure of the Constitution").
134. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1192.
135. Id. at 1173.
136. Id. at 1194.
137. Id. at 1195 (citing James Boyd White, Judicial Criticism, in INTERPRETING LAW AND
LITERATURE 393, 404 (Sanford Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988)).
138. Id. at 1208.
139. Id, at 1208-11, 1252-61 (discussing "structural humility"); Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,
supra note 24, at 1386-92 (discussing political and institutional constraints).
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
grounded in incapacity"). 140
U.S. legal scholars developed the translation model as a guide for U.S.
constitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, it also provides a useful analytical
tool' 4' for understanding China's likely approach to interpreting Hong Kong
Basic Law guarantees. The next part of this Article explains how a
translation approach based on this U.S. model would resolve interpretation
of the Basic Law's "freedom of the press" provision.
III. THE TRANSLATION APPROACH AND "FREEDOM OF THE PRESS"
Under the translation approach, Chinese interpreters provide Hong Kong
with the "equivalent" of the "freedom of the press" it enjoyed before the
handover, with the "smallest possible' 42 adjustments in original meaning to
reflect changed conditions after the handover. The translation approach
roughly 143 approximates Lessig's two-step process. Interpreters initially seek
to determine the meaning of "freedom of the press" in its original context-
pre-handover Hong Kong. Recent P.R.C. official statements suggest that they
will base definition on Hong Kong understandings of "freedom of the press"
as of 1984 (the date of the Joint Declaration) rather than 1997 (the actual
handover date). 144 These statements also indicate that interpreters will
consider "minor" and "ordinary" changes in meaning from 1984-97.
However, these interpreters will reject "major" and "important" changes as
inconsistent with the Joint Declaration's pledge that Hong Kong laws will
remain "basically unchanged."' 145 As a result, interpreters likely will ignore
the radical liberalizing trends in Hong Kong media law and practice during
140. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1252, 1262.
141. As I have noted elsewhere, the application of U.S. methodology to a foreign legal system
poses its own translation problems. See Frances H. Foster, Parental Law, Harmfl Speech, and the
Development ofLegal Culture: Russian Judicial Chamber Discourse and Narrative, 54 WAsH. & LEE
L. REV. 923 (1997). Uncritical use of such methodology without cultural translation can distort the
foreign experience. See id. at 928. Thus, in applying a U.S. methodology to a foreign legal system, the
comparative law scholar must act "with flexibility, caution, and above all, sensitivity to context" and
"be prepared for the unexpected-the divergences from usual patterns, the spontaneous adaptations of
methodology to foreign environment, the new answers to questions formulated in the American
context." Id. at 992. One scholar has already explicitly rejected the translation model for "transitional
regimes." Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106
YALE L. J. 2009, 2075 n.276 (1997) (arguing that translation model's emphasis on "fidelity" to the
Constitution is inappropriate for transitional regimes because "it generally assumes a unitary,
constitutional purpose over time").
142. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1213.
143. The following account is not meant to suggest that Chinese interpreters will self-consciously
apply Lessig's two-step process. Rather, my argument is that they will use an approach that broadly
resembles the two steps articulated by Lessig.
144. See supra notes 68-69.
145. See supra notes 68-69.
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the final decade prior to Hong Kong's reversion to Chinese sovereignty. In
determining the original meaning of "freedom of the press," interpreters will
draw primarily on pre-handover Hong Kong's traditional restrictive "law on
the books" rather than its recent permissive "law in action."
The translation approach, unlike the law on the books approach and the
law in action approach,146 does not freeze and preserve the meaning of
"freedom of the press" as understood in the original context. It also considers
the changed context at the time of interpretation and any effects on the
original meaning of "freedom of the press." Accordingly, under the
translation approach, Chinese interpreters do not simply apply "freedom of
the press" as it would have been applied in pre-handover Hong Kong. They
also identify and address any changes in the key "presuppositions"
underlying the original meaning of "freedom of the press."
There have already been significant changes since 1984 (or even June 30,
1997). Most notably, Hong Kong is now an "inalienable part" of China rather
than a British Crown Colony. These changes have had a direct impact on the
meaning of "freedom of the press." For example, the British colonial
definition of "freedom of the press" excluded the media's right to insult the
Queen. 147 In today's Hong Kong, this restriction has a new meaning because
a basic fact has changed-the British monarch is no longer Hong Kong's
sovereign. During its fifty-year transition to socialism, Hong Kong will likely
experience many other dramatic changes that, in turn, will affect the meaning
of "freedom of the press." Under the translation approach, interpreters
consider and incorporate these changes into their evolving definitions of
"freedom of the press."
Once Chinese interpreters have determined the meaning of "freedom of
the press" in its original context and any changes between the original
context and the new context, they proceed to the second step of the
translation approach. They attempt to fashion a contemporary equivalent of
the original meaning of "freedom of the press" with minor adjustments to
accommodate any changed conditions.
The aforementioned colonial-era prohibition against insulting the Queen
provides an excellent illustration of how this translation process could
operate in practice. A November 1997 interpreter of the Basic Law's
"freedom of the press" guarantee would determine the original meaning of
"freedom of the press." In its pre-handover Hong Kong context, "freedom of
the press" did not include the right of the media to insult the Queen, the then
146. See supra Parts I.C, D.
147. See Sly, supra note 59.
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sovereign of Hong Kong. Due to changed circumstances, the Queen is no
longer the sovereign of Hong Kong; the P.R.C. leadership has assumed that
role. Thus, the modem equivalent of the original meaning of "freedom of the
press" would exclude Hong Kong media publication of materials that insult
the current sovereign, the P.R.C. leadership.
From China's perspective, the translation approach has significant
advantages. The first step of this approach reinforces China's continuing
commitment under the "one country, two systems" policy to maintain Hong
Kong's distinct legal system and way of life. It does so by making Hong
Kong, not P.R.C., law the initial point of reference for any interpretation of
Basic Law guarantees. The second step of the translation approach meets
China's other key objective, flexibility. It provides a rationale and a method
for reinterpreting Basic Law guarantees to accommodate change.
The translation approach is also a natural extension of current Chinese
methods for defining post-1997 Hong Kong's civil liberties. Although China
has not explicitly adopted or even articulated a "translation" model, P.R.C.
spokespersons in practice already have begun to "translate" Basic Law
guarantees. For example, they have justified post-handover restrictions on
press rights to advocate "two Chinas" and "splittism" as updated versions of
pre-1997 British colonial efforts to "safeguard their sovereignty and
territorial integrity and ban inciting remarks undermining unity,
'148
From Hong Kong's perspective, in contrast, the translation approach
poses serious dangers. In effect, China becomes the self-appointed translator
of Hong Kong rights and freedoms. It unilaterally defines the values and
purposes of translation. By controlling the very function of translation, China
ultimately determines whether this process produces "equivalent"
meanings. 49
To compound the problem, China is subject to neither of the translation
constraints identified in the U.S. scholarly literature-familiarity and
humility. 150 The U.S. translation model requires that the translator of a text be
familiar With "its purpose, the assumptions that underlie it, the scope of its
reach, and theories it embraces."'15 Thus far, China falls far short of this
prerequisite for proper translation of Basic Law guarantees. For example, in
their discussions of "freedom of the press," P.R.C. leaders have consistently
148. Editorial, Freedom of the Press and Observing Law, supra note 34, at 91.
149. As Lawrence Lessig has noted, "Whether a translation produces an equivalent meaning will
be dependent on the function of translation itself..... Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at
1197.
150. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
151. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1196 (footnote omitted).
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demonstrated their lack of familiarity and inexperience with pre-1997 Hong
Kong's Western-style definitions. 52 Indeed, these errors have been so
egregious that they raise questions as to whether Chinese officials are even
capable of fashioning "equivalents" for freedoms they so fundamentally
misunderstand.'5
Similarly, China enjoys the "immense power" of the translator without
any "limits of humility," be they "structural" or "grounded in incapacity."
The U.S. translation model's claim of "structural humility" is premised on an
American system of separation of powers and checks and balances. It
assumes a "legal culture" that "requires" "a clear division of labor between
the author" of the text (the legislative branch) and the "translator" (the
judicial branch). 154 Under this scheme, the judicial translator's authority
extends only to "nonpolitical" presuppositions. 55 The translator must
"ignore" "political" presuppositions, which fall within the exclusive
"domain" of the legislative branch.15
6
China, in contrast, explicitly rejects the U.S. concepts of separation of
powers and checks and balances. 57 The P.R.C. national legislature, as
152. For example, in a 1996 CNN interview, China's top official on Hong Kong assured a world
audience that post-1997 restrictions on the Hong Kong media would conform with current
understandings of "freedom of the press" in Hong Kong and the West. In an unfortunate analogy to
what he thought were U.S. restrictions on freedoms of press and speech, Lu Ping declared:
Like in your country. If some press thinks that Hawaii should be separated from your government,
from the United States, that's a different thing."... "If someone advocates a second government
instead of the present government, what do you think? Would it be allowed? I don't think so.
Would two national flags be allowed? Another national flag? Would you allow that? That's a
different thing, you see.
China Assures Hong Kong of Press Freedom, supra note 9, at 90.
153. Many Hong Kong and Western commentators have concluded that the greatest threat to
Hong Kong's future is China's "minimal understanding" of the theoretical and "institutional pillars of
Hong Kong's success." Editorial, Hong Kong's Rule of Law, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 4, 1997, at C6.
They fear that out of ignorance rather than bad faith China may unintentionally kill the "golden goose"
of Hong Kong. See Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; What the Goose Eats, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15,
1996, at 13 ("I believe China has no desire to intentionally harm Hong Kong's unique, freewheeling
character. Hong Kong is a goose that lays golden eggs. But while China's intentions may be benign, its
capabilities are another matter. As one senior Hong Kong official remarked ... , 'I'm not sure they
really understand what the goose eats."'); Prepared Testimony by Merle Goldman, supra note 83
("China's leaders do not want to kill off the 'golden goose' of Hong Kong, but their own authoritarian
political system and narrow view of economic development limits their understanding of how a free
society works.").
154. Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at 1254.
155. Id.
156. Id. (arguing that there is a "domain of protected presuppositions that humility requires judges
to ignore" and defining such presuppositions as "political," that is "presuppositions that, between the
judicial and legislative functions, seem clearly to be within the domain of the legislative").
157. See Cai Dingiian, Constitutional Supervision and Interpretation in the People's Republic of
China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 219, 244 (1995) ("The guiding principle of the Chinese Constitution is one of
democratic centralism, not separation of powers. The NPC is the highest organ of state power, and
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"guided" by the Communist Party, exercises supreme governing authority. 1
58
The Basic Law only confirms this model of legislative supremacy by
assigning China's highest legislative body, not its top judicial organ, the
ultimate power of interpretation. 159 This power specifically includes
consideration of "political" questions.' 60 Thus, unlike the U.S. model, the
"author" of Hong Kong freedoms is also their "translator." As a result,
Chinese translation is subject to none of the practical or theoretical
"structural" constraints of its American counterpart. ,161 q
The final U.S. translation safeguard, "humility of capacity, is equally
inapplicable in the Chinese context. Under this notion, the U.S. model
envisions that the translator will "abstain" voluntarily from any translation
that is beyond the translator's expertise, understanding, or resources.' 62 It
cites actual cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court formally has refused to
because all other state organs are generated by and supervised by the NPC, it is supreme.") (footnote
omitted); Davis, supra note 42, at 778 ("The PRC has bad little use for the American style of
separation of powers with checks and balances."); Zhou Xirong, On Socialist Democracy-Making a
Clear Distinction Between Socialist Democracy and the Parliamentary Democracy of the West,
RENMIN RIBAO (Beijing), Apr. 16, 1996, at 9, translated in FBIS-CHI-96-114, June 12, 1996, at 19,22
(rejecting "bourgeois" separation of powers and checks and balances as intended "to safeguard the rule
by the bourgeoisie").
158. XIANFA, art. 57 (1982) (P.R.C.) ("The National People's Congress of the People's Republic
of China is the highest organ of state power."). Despite its lofty constitutional status, China's national
legislature traditionally has played the role of "rubber stamp" for party decisions. See Frances H.
Foster, Codification in Post-Mao China, 30 Am. J. COMP. L. 395, 414 (1982) (discussing factors that
turned N.P.C. into "rubber stamp"). For a discussion of communist party influence, see Perry Keller,
Legislation in the People's Republic of China, 23 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 653, 655-60 (1989). In
recent years, however, the National People's Congress has begun to "evolv[e] from a position of
political irrelevance." Michael Dowdle, Realizing Constitutional Potential, CHI. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1996, at 30. However, the National People's Congress has by no means achieved independence from
the party. For superb discussions of these trends in legislative development, see generally Kevin J.
O'Brien, Chinese People's Congresses and Legislative Embeddedness: Understanding Early
Legislative Development, 27 COMP. POL. STUD. 80 (1994); Murray Scot Tanner, How a Bill Becomes
a Law in China: Stages and Processes in Lmvmaking, in CHINA'S LEGAL REFORMS 39 (Stanley B.
Lubman ed., 1996); Murray Scot Tanner, Organizations and Politics in China's Post-Mao Law-
Making System, in DOMESTIC LAW REFORMS IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 14, at 56.
159. See Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 158, at 1545 ("The power of interpretation of this Law shall
be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.").
160. Id. (N.P.C. Standing Committee has sole authority to interpret provisions "concerning affairs
which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or conceming the relationship
between the Central Authorities and the Region ....").
161. Lessig uses the terms "humility of capacity" and "humility grounded in incapacity"
interchangeably to describe this constraint. Compare Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, supra note 24, at
1252 (referring to this constraint as "humility of capacity") with id. at 1262 (using term "humility
grounded in incapacity").
162. See id. at 1261 (defining "humility of capacity" as "a recognition of the inability of a court as
currently structured to account for certain kinds of changes in presuppositions, either because the
material at issue is itself too complex, or because the resources necessary to track them are too great").
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render decisions due to incapacity. 163 In the Chinese situation, public
acknowledgment of such incapacity is virtually inconceivable. It would be
tantamount to a formal admission by Chinese authorities that they are
unqualified to rule over capitalist Hong Kong. As the recent debate over
"freedom of the press" has illustrated, Chinese leaders are hypersensitive to
any foreign criticism of their interpretations of pre-1997 Hong Kong rights
and freedoms. They reject Western attempts to "correct" and "enlighten"
them as nothing less than intrusions into Chinese national sovereignty.
64
Thus, like "familiarity" and "structural humility," "humility of capacity" too
offers no real check on Chinese translation of Hong Kong freedoms.
IV. CONCLUSION
For post-1997 Hong Kong, freedom is a matter of interpretation-
Chinese interpretation. Yet, there currently exist no clear-cut rules or
procedures to guide or constrain that interpretation. Hong Kong's founding
documents, the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law, offer only the barest
outlines of an interpretation process. Chinese, Hong Kong, and foreign
observers have attempted to flesh out these provisions, but, as this Article has
demonstrated, with minimal success.
This Article has examined current proposals for interpreting one Hong
Kong freedom, "freedom of the press," and has shown that the six
approaches suggested thus far are implausible choices for China. All six
proposed approaches are flawed in their choice of definitional points of
reference. The first two approaches, the strict literalist approach165 and the
integrated constitution approach,166 confine China's inquiry to an open-
ended charter-the Basic Law-that itself requires interpretation. The
second two approaches, the law on the books approach'67 and the law in
action approach,168 apply pre-handover Hong Kong meanings of "freedom
of the press." As a result, they freeze definition as of 1997 and fail to
accommodate change. The fifth approach, the liberties with Chinese
characteristics approach,169 potentially imposes P.R.C. definitions on Hong
Kong and, hence, undermines the credibility of the "one country, two
163. See id. at 1261-62 (providing examples of cases in which the Supreme Court "abstained"
from decisions due to "incapacity").
164. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part LA.
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. See supra Part I.C.
168. See supra Part I.D.
169. See supra Part I.E.
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systems" policy. The sixth approach, the balancing approach,'70 looks to
international experience for definition. Because there is in fact no common
meaning of the term "freedom of the press," this approach lacks clarity and
predictability. The principal problem is that these approaches fail to
accommodate China's larger policy goals for the post-1997 era. If adopted,
they would impede P.R.C. efforts to implement its "one country, two
systems" model in an effective, credible, and flexible manner.
The translation approach, drawn from U.S. literature,17 1 provides a better
framework for understanding the methods that China has and will be using to
define post-1997 Hong Kong's civil liberties. Within that framework, China
can retain its credibility-both in Hong Kong and in the rest of the world-
with regard to its pledge of "one country, two systems" and the flexibility
that China considers a central element of its sovereignty.
72
The approach proceeds in two steps. 73 In the first step, China as the
translator determines pre-handover Hong Kong understandings of "freedom
of the press" as they existed in law and practice. In the second step, China
attempts to fashion a contemporary equivalent of the original meanings of
"freedom of the press" with the "minor" adjustments necessary to
accommodate changed circumstances. In so doing, China ostensibly adheres
to methods of constitutional interpretation applied elsewhere in the world.
The translation approach may leave the Chinese interpreter with
considerably more flexibility than it does the corresponding interpreter of the
U.S. Constitution-the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme
Court is, at least in theory, limited by its familiarity with the original context
and meaning of the Constitution, separation of powers, and its self-imposed
abstention doctrine.' 74 None of these constraints exists in the Chinese
context.' 75 Thus, the resulting framework is one in which China can enjoy
the "immense power" of the translator, while maintaining its commitments
under the "one country, two systems" policy through standards of
interpretation potentially acceptable to the rest of the world. For Hong Kong,
however, the translation approach poses serious dangers. Hong Kong
freedom ultimately may be lost in Chinese translation.
170. See supra Part I.F.
171. See supra Part II.
172. See supra Part III.
173. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 137-41, 155-57, 163-64 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 157-61, 165 and accompanying text.
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